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Abstract
Neural networks have been proven to be vulnerable to
a variety of adversarial attacks. From a safety perspec-
tive, highly sparse adversarial attacks are particularly dan-
gerous. On the other hand the pixelwise perturbations of
sparse attacks are typically large and thus can be poten-
tially detected. We propose a new black-box technique
to craft adversarial examples aiming at minimizing l0-
distance to the original image. Extensive experiments show
that our attack is better or competitive to the state of the art.
Moreover, we can integrate additional bounds on the com-
ponentwise perturbation. Allowing pixels to change only in
region of high variation and avoiding changes along axis-
aligned edges makes our adversarial examples almost non-
perceivable. Moreover, we adapt the Projected Gradient
Descent attack to the l0-norm integrating componentwise
constraints. This allows us to do adversarial training to
enhance the robustness of classifiers against sparse and im-
perceivable adversarial manipulations.
1. Introduction
State-of-the-art neural networks are not robust [3, 30,
12], in the sense that a very small adversarial change of a
correctly classified input leads to a wrong decision. While
[30, 12] have brought up this problem in object recognition
tasks, the problem itself has been discussed for some time
in the area of email spam classification [9, 19]. This non-
robust behavior of neural networks is a problem when such
classifiers are used for decision making in safety-critical
systems e.g. in autonomous driving or medical diagnosis
systems. Thus it is important to be aware of the possible
vulnerabilities as they can lead to fatal failures beyond the
eminent security issue [18].
Recent research on attacks can be divided into white-box
attacks [23, 6, 5, 21, 8], where one has access to the model
at attack time, and black box attacks [7, 4, 13, 2] where one
can just query the output of the classifier or the confidence
scores of all classes. Typically the attacks try to find points
on or close to the decision boundary, where the distance is
measured in the pixels space, most often wrt the l∞- and
original l_0
l_0 + l_inf l_0 + <-map
Figure 1: Upper left: original image with box for zoom,
Upper Right: our l0-attack, very few pixels, only 0.04%, are
changed, but the modified pixels are clearly visible, Lower
left: the result of the l0+ l∞-attack as proposed in [22], the
modifications are sparse, 2.7% of the pixels are changed,
but clearly visible, Lower right: our sparse, 2.7% of the
pixels are changed, but imperceivable attack (l0 + σ-map).
l2-norm [23, 6, 5, 8], or one tries to maximize the loss resp.
minimize the confidence in the correct class in some -ball
around the original image [21]. Non pixelwise attacks ex-
ploiting geometric transformations have been proposed in
[14, 32]. While it has been argued that adversarial changes
will not happen in practical scenarios, this argument has
been refuted in [16, 11]. Adversarial attacks during training
have been early on proposed as a potential defense [30, 12],
now known as adversarial training. In the form proposed
in [21] this is one of the few defenses which could not be
broken easily [5, 1].
In this paper we are dealing specifically with sparse ad-
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versarial attacks, that is we want to modify the smallest
amount of pixels in order to change the decision. There
are currently white-box attacks based on variants of gradi-
ent based methods integrating the l0-constraint [6, 22] or
mainly black-box attacks which use either local search or
evolutionary algorithms [24, 29, 28]. The paper has the
following methodological contributions: 1) we suggest a
novel black-box attack based on local search which outper-
forms all existing l0-attacks, 2) we present closed form ex-
pressions or simple algorithms for the projections onto the
l0-ball (or intersection of l0-ball and componentwise con-
straints) in order to extend the PGD attack of [21] to the
considered scenario, 3) since sparse attacks are often clearly
visible and thus, at least in some cases, easy to detect (see
upper right image of Figure 1), we combine the sparsity
constraint (l0-ball) with componentwise constraints, and
we extend the two l0-attacks mentioned above to produce
sparse and imperceivable adversarial perturbations.
Compared to [22] who introduce global componentwise
constraints (see lower left image of Figure 1) we propose
to use locally adaptive componentwise constraints. These
local constraints ensure that the change is typically not visi-
ble, that is we neither change color too much, nor we change
pixels along edges aligned with the coordinate axis (see the
Appendix for a visualization) or in regions which have uni-
form color (see lower right image of Figure 1). This is in
line with, and significantly improves upon, [20], who sug-
gest to perturb pixels in regions of high variance to have less
recognizable modifications. In fact the often employed l∞-
attacks which modify each pixel only slightly but have to
manipulate all pixels seem not to model perturbations which
could actually occur. We think that our sparse and imper-
ceivable attacks could happen in practice and correspond
to modifications which do not change the semantics of the
images even on very small scales. The good news of our pa-
per is that the success rate of such attacks (50-70% success
rate for standard models) is smaller than that of the com-
monly used ones - nevertheless we find it disturbing that
such manipulations are possible at all. Thus we also test
if adversarial training can reduce the success rate of such
attacks. We find that adversarial training wrt l2 partially
decreases the effectiveness of l0-attacks, while adversarial
training wrt either l2 or l∞ helps to be more robust against
sparse and imperceivable attacks. Finally, we introduce ad-
versarial training aiming specifically at robustness wrt both
our attack models.
2. Sparse and imperceivable adversarial at-
tacks
Let f : Rd −→ RK be a multi-class classifier, where d
is the input dimension and K the number of classes. A test
point x ∈ Rd is classified as c = argmax
r=1,...,K
fr(x). The min-
imal adversarial perturbation y∗ of x ∈ Rd with respect to
a distance function γ : Rd −→ R+ is given as the solution
y∗ ∈ Rd of the optimization problem
min
y∈Rd
γ(y − x)
s.th. argmax
r=1,...,K
fr(y) 6= argmax
r=1,...,K
fr(x),
y ∈ C,
(1)
where C is a set of constraints valid inputs need to satisfy
(e.g. images are scaled to be in [0, 1]d). Said otherwise: y∗
is the closest point to x wrt the distance function γ which
is classified differently from x.
2.1. Sparse l0-attack
In an l0-attack one is interested in finding the smallest
number of pixels which need to be changed so that the deci-
sion changes. We write in the following gray-scale images
x with d pixels as vectors in [0, 1]d and color images x with
d pixels as matrices x in [0, 1]d×3, and xi denotes the i-th
pixel with the three color channels in RGB. The correspond-
ing distance function γ is thus given for gray-scale images
as the standard l0-norm
γ(y − x) =
d∑
i=1
1|yi−xi|6=0, (2)
and for color images as
γ(y − x) =
d∑
i=1
max
j=1,...,3
1|yij−xij |6=0, (3)
where the inner maximization checks if any color channel
j of the pixel i is changed. From a practical point of view
the l0-attack tests basically how vulnerable the model is to
failure of pixels or large localized changes on an object e.g.
a sticker on a refrigerator or dirt/dust on a windshield.
2.2. Sparse and Imperceivable attack
The problem of l0-attacks is that they are completely un-
constrained in the way how they change each pixel. Thus
the perturbed pixels have usually completely different color
than the surrounding ones and thus are easily visible. On
the other hand l∞-attacks, using the distance function
γ(y − x) = max
i=1,...,d
max
j=1,...,3
|yij − xij |,
are known to result in very small changes per pixel but have
to modify every pixel and color channel. This seems to
be a quite unrealistic perturbation model from a practical
point of view. A much more realistic attack model which
could happen in a practical scenario is when the changes are
sparse but also imperceivable. In order to achieve this we
come up with additional constraints on the allowed chan-
nelwise change. In [22] they suggest to have global bounds,
for some fixed δ > 0, in the form
xij − δ ≤ yij ≤ xij + δ,
which should ensure that the changes are not visible (we
call an attack with l0-norm and these global component-
wise bounds an l0 + l∞-attack in the following). However,
these global bounds are completely agnostic of the image
and thus δ has to be really small so that the changes are
not visible even in regions of homogeneous color, e.g. sky,
where almost any variation is easily spotted. We suggest
image-specific local bounds taking into account the image
structure. We have two specific goals:
1) We do not want to make changes along edges which
are aligned with the coordinate axis as they can be eas-
ily spotted and detected.
2) We do not want to change the color too much and
rather just adjust its intensity and keep approximately
also its saturation level.
In order to achieve this we compute the standard deviation
of each color channel in x- and y-axis directions with the
two immediate neighboring pixels and the original pixel.
We denote the corresponding values as σ(x)ij and σ
(y)
ij and
define σij =
√
min{σ(x)ij , σ(y)ij }. Since σ(x)ij , σ(y)ij ∈ [0, 1]
the square root increases more significantly, in relative
value, smaller min{σ(x)ij , σ(y)ij }. In this way we both enlarge
the space of the possible adversarial examples and prevent
perturbations in areas of zero variance. In fact we allow the
changed image y just to have values given by
yij = (1 + λiσij)xij , with − κ ≤ λi ≤ κ, (4)
where κ > 0. Additionally, we enforce box constraints
y ∈ [0, 1]d×3. Note that the parameter λi corresponds to
a change in intensity of pixel i by maximally plus/minus
κ
∑3
j=1 σijxij as
3∑
j=1
yij =
3∑
j=1
xij + λi
3∑
j=1
σijxij .
Thus we are just changing intensity of the pixel instead of
the actual color. Moreover, note that this change also pre-
serves the saturation of the color value1 if the σij are equal
for j = 1, . . . , 3. Thus we fulfill the second requirement
from above. Moreover, the first requirement is satisfied as
1In the HSV color space the saturation of a color is defined as 1 −
min{R,G,B}
max{R,G,B} , where R,G,B are the red/green/blue color channels in
RGB color space.
σij =
√
min{σ(x)ij , σ(y)ij }, meaning that if along one of the
coordinates there is no change in all color channels then
the pixel cannot be modified at all. Thus pixels along a
coordinate-aligned edge showing no change in color will
not be changed. The attack model of sparse and imperceiv-
able attacks will be abbreviated as l0 + σ-map. For gray-
scale images x ∈ [0, 1]d we use instead
yi = xi + λiσi, with − κ ≤ λi ≤ κ. (5)
as there the approximate preservation of color saturation is
not needed.
3. Algorithms for sparse (and imperceivable)
attacks
In this paper we propose two methods to generate l0-,
l0 + l∞ and l0 + σ-attacks. The first one is a randomized
black-box attack based on the logits (the output of the neural
network before the softmax layer) of the classifier. The sec-
ond is a generalization of projected gradient descent (PGD)
on the loss of the correct label [21] to our different attack
models. For each attack model we will derive algorithms
for the projection onto the corresponding sets.
3.1. Score-based sparse (and imperceivable) attack
Most of the existing black-box l0-attacks either start with
perturbing a small set of pixels and then enlarge this set
until they find an adversarial example [26, 24] or, given a
successful adversarial manipulation, try to progressively re-
duce the number of pixels exploited to change the classifica-
tion [6, 28]. Instead we introduce a flexible attack scheme
where at the beginning one checks pixelwise targeted at-
tacks and then sorts them according to the resulting gap in
the classifier outputs. Then we introduce a probability dis-
tribution on the sorted list and sample one-pixel changes to
generate attacks where more pixels are manipulated simul-
taneously. The distribution we use is biased towards the
one-pixel perturbations which produce, when applied indi-
vidually, already large changes in the classifier output. In
this non-iterative scheme there is thus no danger to get stuck
in suboptimal points. Moreover, while the attack has to test
many points, its non-iterative nature allows to check the per-
turbed points in large batches which is thus much faster than
an evolutionary attack. Even if the scheme is simple it out-
performs all existing methods including white-box attacks.
One-pixel modifications In the first step we check all
one pixel modifications of the original image x ∈ [0, 1]d×3
(color) or x ∈ [0, 1]d (gray-scale). The tested modifications
depend on the attack model.
1. l0-attack: for each pixel i we generate 8 = 23 images
changing the original color value to one of the 8 cor-
ners of the RGB color cube. Thus we name our method
CornerSearch. This results in a set of 8d images, all
one pixel modifications of the original image x, which
we denote by (z(j))8dj=1. For gray-scale images one just
checks the extreme gray-scale values (black and white)
and gets (z(j))2dj=1.
2. l0 + l∞-attack: for each pixel i we generate 8 images
changing the original color value of (xij)3j=1 by the
corners of the cube [−, ]3 resulting again in (z(j))8dj=1
images. For gray-scale we use xi ±  resulting in total
in (z(j))2dj=1 images. If necessary we clip to satisfy the
constraint z(j) ∈ [0, 1]d×3 or z(j) ∈ [0, 1]d.
3. l0 + σ-map attack: for color images we generate for
each pixel i two images by setting
yij = (1± κσij)xij , j = 1, . . . , 3,
where κ and σij are as defined in Section 2. For gray
scale images x ∈ [0, 1]d we use
yi = xi ± κσi.
Finally, we clip yij and yi to [0, 1]. Thus, this results
in (z(j))2dj=1 images. We call it σ-CornerSearch.
After the generation of all the images we get the classi-
fier output f(z(j))Mj=1 for each of them, where M is the
total number of generated images, either M = 2d or
M = 8d. Then, separately for each class r 6= c, where
c = argmax
r=1,...,K
fr(x), we sort the values of
fr(z
(j))− fc(z(j))
in decreasing order pi(r). That means for all 1 ≤ s ≤M−1
fr(z
(pi(r)s ))− fc(z(pi(r)s )) ≥ fr(z(pi
(r)
s+1))− fc(z(pi
(r)
s+1)).
We introduce also an order pi(c), sorting in decreasing order
the quantities
maxr 6=c fr(z(j))− fc(z(j)).
The idea behind generating these one-pixel perturbations is
to identify the pixels which push most the decision towards
a particular class r or in case of the set pi(c) towards an un-
specific change. If fr(z(pi
(r)
1 )) − fc(z(pi
(r)
1 )) > 0 for some
r, then the decision has changed by only modifying one
pixel. In this case the algorithm stops immediately. Oth-
erwise, one could try to iteratively select the most effec-
tive change and repeat the one-pixel perturbations. How-
ever, this is overly expensive and again suffers if subopti-
mal pixel modifications are chosen in the initial steps of the
iterative scheme. Thus we suggest in the next paragraph a
sampling scheme based on the obtained orderings, where
one randomly selects k one-pixel modifications to combine
in order to produce a multi-pixels attack.
Multi-pixels modifications Most of the times the modi-
fications of one pixel are not sufficient to change the deci-
sion. Suppose we want to generate a candidate for a targeted
adversarial sample towards class r by changing at most k
pixels, choosing among the first N one-pixel perturbations
according to the ordering pi(r). We do this by sampling k
indices (s1, . . . , sk) in {1, . . . , N} from the probability dis-
tribution on {1, . . . , N} defined as
P (Z = i) =
2N − 2i+ 1
N2
, i = 1, . . . , N. (6)
The candidate image y(r) is generated by applying all the k
one-pixel changes defined in the images z(pi
(r)
s1
), . . . , z(pi
(r)
sk
)
to the original image x. Please note that we only sample
from the top N one-pixel changes found in the previous
paragraph and that the distribution on {1, . . . , N} is biased
towards sampling on the top of the list e.g. P (Z = 1) =
2N−1
N2 is 2N − 1 larger than P(Z = N) = 1N2 . This bias
ensures that we are mainly accumulating one-pixel changes
which have led individually already to a larger change of the
decision towards the target class r. We produce candidate
images y(1), . . . , y(K) for all K classes, having K − 1 can-
didate images targeted towards changes in a particular class
and one image where the attack is untargeted (for r = c). In
total we repeat this process Niter times. The big advantage
of the sampling scheme compared to an iterative scheme is
that all these images can be fed into the classifier in batches
in parallel which compared to a sequential processing is sig-
nificantly faster. Moreover, it does not depend on previous
steps and thus cannot get stuck in some suboptimal regions.
As shown in the experiments this relatively simple sampling
scheme performs better than sophisticated evolutionary al-
gorithms (black-box attacks) and even white-box attacks.
Since we want to find adversarial examples differing
from x in as few pixels as possible, we generate the batches
y(1), . . . , y(K) of candidate images as described above,
gradually increasing k, up to a threshold kmax, until we get a
classification different from the original class c. Algorithm
1 summarizes the main steps.
4. PGD for sparse and imperceivable attacks
The projected gradient descent (PGD) attack of Madry
et al [21] is not aiming at finding the smallest adversarial
perturbation but instead argues from the viewpoint of robust
optimization about maximizing the loss
max
z∈C(x)
L(c, f(z)),
where L : {1, . . . ,K} × RK → R+ is usually chosen to
be the cross-entropy loss, c is the correct label of the point
x and the set C(x) ⊂ [0, 1]d×3 (color images with d pixels)
or C(x) ⊂ [0, 1]d (gray-scale images). The interpretation
Algorithm 1: CornerSearch
Input : x original image classified as class c, K
number of classes, N, kmax, Niter
Output: y adversarial example
1 y ← ∅
2 create one-pixels modifications (z(i))Mi=1
3 if exists u ∈ (z(i))Mi=1 classified not as c then
4 y ← u, return
5 end
6 compute orderings pi(1), . . . , pi(K),
7 k ← 2
8 while k ≤ kmax do
9 for r = 1, . . . ,K do
10 create the set Y (r) of Niter “k-pixels
modifications” towards class r (see paragraph
above)
11 if ∃u ∈ Y (r) classified not as c then
12 y ← u, return
13 end
14 end
15 k ← k + 1
16 end
in terms of robust optimization [21] has led to a now well-
accepted way of adversarial training with the goal of getting
robust wrt a fixed set of perturbations. The usage of PGD
attacks during training is the de facto standard for adversar-
ial training, which we will also use later on in Section 5.
Commonly used as the set of allowed perturbations is the
l∞-ball: C(x) = {z | ‖z − x‖∞ ≤ , z ∈ [0, 1]d} as the
projection can be done analytically.
In order to extend PGD to l0- and l0+l∞-attacks, we first
have to capture the sets allowed in our attack models in Sec-
tion 2 and then find fast algorithms for the projections onto
these sets. Once this is available PGD is ready to be used as
an attack and for adversarial training. In the Appendix we
also show how to project onto the intersection of the l0-ball
and the componentwise constraints given by the σ-map, for
both color and gray-scale images. Thanks to this, we can
introduce an l0 + σ-map version of PGD, called σ-PGD,
able to produce the sparse and imperceivable perturbations
we have introduced.
4.1. Projection onto the l0-ball and l0+l∞-ball
Given an original color image x ∈ [0, 1]d×3 we want to
project a given point y ∈ Rd×3 onto the set
C(x) =
{
z ∈ Rd×3 ∣∣ d∑
i=1
max
j=1,2,3
1|zij−xij |>0 ≤ k,
lij ≤ zij ≤ uij
}
.
We can write the projection problem onto C(x) as
min
z∈Rd×3
d∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
(yij − zij)2
s. th. lij ≤ zij ≤ uij , i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , 3
d∑
i=1
max
j=1,2,3
1|zij−xij |>0 > 0 ≤ k
Ignoring the combinatorial constraint, we first solve for
each pixel i the problem
min
zi∈R3
d∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
(yij − zij)2
s. th. lij ≤ zij ≤ uij , i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , 3
The solution is given by z∗ij = max{lij ,min{yij , uij}}.
We note that each pixel can be optimized independently
from the other pixels. Thus we sort in decreasing order pi
the gains
φi :=
3∑
j=1
(yij − xij)2 −
3∑
j=1
(yij − z∗ij)2.
achieved by each pixel i. Thus the final solution differs from
x in the k pixels (or less if there are less than k pixels with
positive φi) which have the largest gain and is given by
zpiij =
{
z∗piij for i = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . , 3,
xpiij else.
.
Using lij = 0 and uij = 1 we recover the projection
onto the intersection of l0-ball and [0, 1]d×3. For l0 + l∞
note that the two constraints
0 ≤ zij ≤ 1, − ≤ zij − xij ≤ ,
are equivalent to:
max{0,−+ xij} ≤ zij ≤ min{1, xij + }.
Thus by using
lij = max{0,−+ xij}, uij = min{1, xij + },
the set C(x) is equal to the intersection of the l0-ball of
radius k, the l∞-ball of radius  around x and [0, 1]d×3,
5. Experiments
In the experimental section, we evaluate the effectiveness
of our score-based l0-attack CornerSearch and our white-
box attack PGD0. Moreover, we give illustrative exam-
ples of our sparse and imperceivable l0 + σ-map attacks
σ-CornerSearch and σ-PGD (the latter in the Appendix).
Finally, we test adversarial training wrt various norms as
a defense against our l0- and l0 + σ-map-attacks. The
code is available at https://github.com/fra31/
sparse-imperceivable-attacks.
LocSearchAdv PA 10x CW SparseFool JSMA CornerSearch
black-box Yes Yes No No No Yes
MNIST
success rate 91.39% 92.35% 87.9% 100% 99.6% 97.38%
mean (pixels) 17.56 8.82 46.04 19.44 83.92 9.21
median (pixels) - 8 44 12 46 7
CIFAR-10
success rate 97.32% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.56%
mean (pixels) 38.4 4.63 16.55 16.10 54.5 2.75
median (pixels) - 3 11 12 47 2
Table 1: Comparison of different l0-attacks. While SparseFool is always successful it requires significantly more pixels to
be changed. Our method CornerSearch requires out of all attacks the least median amount of pixels to be changed.
SparseFool CornerSearch
black-box No Yes
success rate 100% 93.26%
mean (pixels) 143.2 106.7
median (pixels) 101 50
Table 2: l0-attacks on Restricted ImageNet. We attack
the 89 correctly classified points out of 100 points from
the validation set with SparseFool [22] and our algorithm
CornerSearch. Due to the limit on the allowed number of
pixel changes, CornerSearch is not always successful, but
requires many less pixels to be changed.
5.1. Evaluation of l0-attacks
We compare CornerSearch with state-of-the-art attacks
for sparse adversarial perturbations: LocSearchAdv [24],
Pointwise Attack (PA) [28], Carlini-Wagner l0-attack (CW)
[6], SparseFool (SF) [22], JSMA [26]. The first two operate
in a black-box scenario, exploiting only the classifier out-
put, like our method, while the latter three require access to
the network itself (white-box attacks). Note that SparseFool
is actually an l1-attack, that means it uses the l1-norm as
distance measure in (1) in order to avoid the combinatorial
problem arising from the usage of the l0-norm. However,
SparseFool can produce sparse attacks and in [22] has been
shown to outperform l0-attacks in terms of sparsity. We
use the implementation of the Pointwise Attack in [27]
with 10 restarts as done in [28], CW and JSMA from [25],
while we reimplemented SparseFool. Since neither the
code nor the models used in [24] are available (the results
for LocSearchAdv are taken from [24]), we decided to
compare the performance of the different attacks on one of
the architectures reported in [24], the Network in Network
[17] with batch normalization, retrained on MNIST and
CIFAR-10.
We run the attacks on the first 1000 points of the corre-
sponding test sets. We use CornerSearch with kmax = 50,
N = 100 and Niter = 1000. In Table 1 we report the
success rate of each method, that is the fraction of correctly
Figure 2: Evaluation of PGD0. We compute for 1000 test
points the robust accuracy of the classifier when the attack
is allowed to perturb at most k pixels. We can see that
PGD0 (red dots) outperforms SparseFool, thus being the
best “cheap” attack, and it is even the best one on MNIST
for k ≥ 4.
classified points which can be successfully attacked, mean
and median number of pixels that every attack needs to
modify to change the decision. Please recall that MNIST
consists of images with 784 pixels and CIFAR-10 with
1024 pixels. Although CornerSearch does not find an
adversarial example for each test point, since we fix the
maximum number of pixels that can be modified, both the
average and median number of changed pixels are lower
than those of the other methods, that is less pixels need to
be perturbed by our method to change the decision (with
the only exception of the mean on MNIST, where anyway
CornerSearch has higher success rate and lower median
than PA). On MNIST CornerSearch requires for at least
50% of all test images 0.89% of the pixels to be changed
and for CIFAR-10 it is even just 0.2%.
Using the derivation in Section 4 of the projection onto
the l0- resp. l0 + l∞-ball, we introduce an l0 version of
the well-known PGD attack on the cross-entropy function
L, namely PGD0. The iterative scheme, to be repeated for a
fixed number of iterations, is, given an input x assigned to
class c,
z(i) = x(i−1) + η · ∇L(c,f(x(i−1))/‖∇L(c,f(x(i−1))‖
1
x(i) = Pk(z
(i)),
(7)
where η ∈ R+, x(0) = x, Pk(z) represents the projection
onto the l0-ball, with the radius fixed at k, and the l∞-ball
defined by the box constraint x ∈ [0, 1]d. Note that PGD0
needs k to be specified and thus does not aim at the minimal
modification to change the decision as in (1). In order to
evaluate the robust accuracy, that is the accuracy of the
classifier when the goal of the attacker is to change the
decision of all correctly classified images using k-pixels
modifications, one needs to evaluate PGD0 for each value
of k separately, whereas all other attacks yield the robust
accuracy for all levels of sparsity in one run.
For comparison we run PGD0, using 20 iterations and 10
random restarts, with 10 sparsity values k on the networks
of Table 1 (see Appendix for more details). In Figure
2 we show the robust accuracy of the different attacks.
PGD0 achieves the best results on MNIST for k ≥ 4,
outperforms SparseFool and is even close to CornerSearch
on CIFAR-10. As PGD0 is very fast, it is a valuable
alternative to our more expensive score-based attack.
We further test CornerSearch on Restricted ImageNet,
that is a subset of ImageNet [10] where some of the classes
are grouped to form 9 distinct macro-classes. We use the
ResNet-50 from [31] and compare our attack to SparseFool
[22] (we do not run the other methods as either no code is
available or they do not scale to the size of the images). The
images have 50176 pixels.
In Table 2 we report the statistics on 100 points for Sparse-
Fool and our attack with kmax = 1000, Niter = 1000. As
for the other datasets, SparseFool always finds an adversar-
ial example, whereas the smallest mean and median adver-
sarial modification is achieved by CornerSearch, although
with an inferior success rate. The runtime for SparseFool
is around 55 times smaller than for CornerSearch. The run-
time of our attack directly scales with the number of pixels
and the time of a forward pass of the network, both large in
this case. However, please note that SparseFool is a white-
box attack, whereas ours is a black-box attack. For a com-
parison to PGD0, given 100 pixels of budget, SF achieves a
success rate of 49.4%, CS 64.0%, PGD0 39.3%.
l0 l0 + σ
training PA SF PGD0 CS σPGD σCS
MNIST k = 15 k = 50
plain 25.6 41.2 3.6 9.2 49.2 80.4
l∞-at 1.6 96.0 60.0 0.0 88.2 90.0
l2-at 73.0 85.0 34.0 55.4 80.2 89.2
l0-at 55.8 63.6 74.6 39.8 57.8 73.8
l0 + σ-at 19.4 26.8 9.4 15.4 93.6 95.4
CIFAR-10 k = 10 k = 100
plain 15.2 57.0 7.0 2.2 27.6 52.4
l∞-at 28.6 57.6 22.6 10.8 50.4 63.6
l2-at 37.6 60.6 25.4 13.8 53.2 66.0
l0-at 64.2 63.8 54.8 46.0 34.6 58.2
l0 + σ-at 41.6 54.4 6.0 5.6 62.8 67.6
Table 3: Evaluation of adversarial training. Robust accu-
racy (%) given by l0- and l0 + σ-attacks (changing at most
k pixels and for l0 + σ-attacks fixing κ = 0.8 for MNIST
and κ = 0.4 for CIFAR-10) on models adversarially trained
wrt different metrics.
5.2. Sparse and Imperceivable manipulations
We illustrate the differences of the adversarial modifica-
tions found by l0-, l0 + l∞- and l0 + σ-map attacks. In
Figures 3 and 4 we show some examples. As discussed
before the adversarial modifications produced wrt only the
l0-norm are the sparsest but also the easiest to recognize.
The l0+ l∞-attack provides images where, although the ab-
solute value of the individual modification is bounded (we
use here δ = 0.1 for CIFAR-10, δ = 0.05 for ImageNet),
some perturbations are visible since either colors are not ho-
mogeneous with the neighbors (second rows of the left part
of Figure 3 and right part of Figure 4) or modifications of
an uniform background are introduced (second row of the
right part of Figure 3 and left part of Figure 4). On the other
hand, the adversarial modifications of σ-CornerSearch are
imperceivable while still being very sparse (third rows of
Figures 3 and 4), showing that the σ-map, also shown in the
Figures rescaled so that the largest component is equal to 1,
is able to correctly identify the area where a change is diffi-
cult to perceive (see in particular the zoomed images).
We provide a comparison of the adversarial examples
crafted by σ-CornerSearch and σ-PGD in the Appendix.
5.3. Adversarial training
In order to increase robustness of the models to sparse
adversarial manipulations, we adapt adversarial training to
our cases. We use PGD0 presented above for adversarial
training in order to achieve robustness against l0-attacks
(l0-at), while we use σ-PGD to enhance robustness against
original l_0 perturbation sparsity:0.2% original l_0 perturbation sparsity:0.098%
l_0 + l_inf perturbation sparsity:1.2% l_0 + l_inf perturbation sparsity:0.59%
<-map l_0 + <-map perturbation sparsity:7.9% <-map l_0 + <-map perturbation sparsity:3.3%
Figure 3: Different attacks on CIFAR-10. We illustrate the differences of the adversarial examples (second column) found
by CornerSearch (l0), l0+l∞-attack and σ-CornerSearch respectively first, second and third row. The third column shows the
adversarial perturbations rescaled to [0, 1], the fourth the map of the modified pixels (sparsity column). The original image
can be found top left and the RGB representation of the σ-map bottom left.
original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.05% original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.05%
l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:2.7% l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:1.8%
<-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:2.7% <-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:2.3%
Figure 4: Different attacks on Restricted ImageNet. We illustrate the differences of the adversarial examples (second
column, zoom in third column) found by CornerSearch (l0), l0 + l∞-attack and σ-CornerSearch, respectively first, second
and third row. The fourth column shows the map of the modified pixels (sparsity column). The original image is in the top
left and the RGB representation of the rescaled σ-map in the bottom left.
sparse and imperceivable attacks (l0 + σ-at). With these
two techniques we train models on MNIST and CIFAR-10
(more details about the architectures and hyerparameters in
the Appendix). We compare them to the models trained on
the plain training set and with adversarial training wrt the
l∞- and l2-norm (l∞-at and l∞-at). In Table 3 we report the
robust accuracy on 500 points (we fix the maximum num-
ber of pixels to be modified to k, and the parameter of the
l0 + σ attacks defined in (4) and (5) to κ = 0.8 for MNIST
and κ = 0.4 for CIFAR-10).
On MNIST the models trained on l2 and l0 perturbations
are the most robust against l0-attacks, while on CIFAR-10
the l0-at model is more than 3 times more resistant than all
the others. Similarly to [22] we find that l∞-at does not
help for l0-robustness. Notably, on both dataset our attacks
PGD0 and CornerSearch (CS) achieve the best results and
then are the most suitable to evaluate robustness.
Regarding the l0 + σ-map attacks, we see that the l0 + σ-
at models are the least vulnerable, but also l∞-at and l2-at
show some robustness. Note that σ-PGD is more successful
than σ-CornerSearch but produces less sparse perturbations
as it always fully exploits the budget of k pixels to mod-
ify while σ-CS mostly uses just a few of them, making the
modifications even more difficult to spot (see Appendix).
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A. Projection onto the intersection of the l0-ball
and the σ-map constraints
We here present the projection step which is used for the
σ-PGD attack, where we allow perturbations on at most k
pixels and respecting the σ-map constraints which are de-
fined in (4) and (5).
A.1. Color images
Given a color image x ∈ [0, 1]d×3, we want to project a
given point y ∈ Rd×3 onto the set
C(x) =
{
z ∈Rd×3 ∣∣ d∑
i=1
max
j=1,...,3
1|zij−xij |>0 ≤ k,
(1− κσij)xij ≤ zij ≤ (1 + κσij)xij ,
0 ≤ zij ≤ 1
}
,
where d is the number of pixels, σij are the pixelwise,
channel-specific bounds defined in Section 2 and κ > 0
a given parameter. We can write the projection problem as
min
λ∈Rd
d∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
(yij − (1 + λiσij)xij)2
s. th. − κ ≤ λi ≤ κ, i = 1, . . . , d
0 ≤ (1 + λiσij)xij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , 3
d∑
i=1
1|λi|>0 ≤ k
Ignoring the combinatorial constraint, we first solve for
each pixel the problem
min
λi∈R
3∑
j=1
(yij − (1 + λiσij)xij)2
s. th. − κ ≤ λi ≤ κ
0 ≤ (1 + λiσij)xij ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , 3
We first note that the last constraint is always fulfilled if
xij = 0 or σij = 0. In the other case we can rewrite the
constraint as
− 1
σij
≤ λi ≤ 1
σij
( 1
xij
− 1
)
, j = 1, . . . , 3.
Combining all constraints yields
λ
(l)
i :=max
{
− κ, max
j
xij 6=0,σij 6=0
− 1
σij
}
≤ λi
≤ min
{
κ, min
j
xij 6=0,σij 6=0
1
σij
( 1
xij
− 1
)}
:= λ
(u)
i .
The unconstrained solution is given by
λ′i =
∑3
j=1 σijxij(yij − xij)∑3
j=1 σ
2
ijx
2
ij
.
Thus the optimal solution for each pixel i is given by
λ∗i = max{λ(l)i ,min{λ′i, λ(u)i }}.
The final solution of the original problem allows only to
choose k pixels to be changed. For each pixel i the quantity
φi :=
3∑
j=1
(yij − xij)2 −
3∑
j=1
(yij − (1 + λ∗i σij)xij)2
represents the difference in how much the objective in-
creases between the cases λi = 0 (that is yi is projected
to xi) and λi = λ∗i . Since we want to minimize the ob-
jective function, the optimal solution is obtained by sorting
(φi)
d
i=1 in decreasing order pi and setting
λ(final)pii =
{
λ∗pii if i = 1, . . . , k,
0 else .
.
Finally, the point belonging to C(x) onto which y is pro-
jected is z ∈ Rd×3 defined componentwise by
zij = (1 + λ
(final)
i σij)xij , i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , 3.
A.2. Gray-scale images
Since gray-scale images have only one color channel
and, to get imperceivable manipulations, we use additive
modifications as defined in (5), we project onto the set,
given the original image x,
C(x) =
{
z ∈ Rd ∣∣ d∑
i=1
1|zi−xi|>0 ≤ k,
xi − κσi ≤ zi ≤ xi + κσi,
0 ≤ zi ≤ 1
}
.
Defining
li := max{xi − κσi, 0}, ui := min{xi + κσi, 1},
we can see that in this case the problem is equivalent to
the projection onto the intersection of an l0-ball and box
constraints and then solved as illustrated in Section 4.1.
test accuracy of the attacked models
section dataset model accuracy
Section 5.1
MNIST NiN [17] 99.66%
CIFAR-10 NiN [17] 90.62%
R-ImageNet ResNet-50
[31]
94.46%
Sections
5.2, 5.3, B.2
MNIST
plain [21] 99.17%
l∞-at [21] 98.53%
l2-at 98.95%
l0-at 96.38%
l0 + σ-at 99.29%
CIFAR-10
plain 88.38%
l∞-at 79.90%
l2-at 80.44%
l0-at 82.31%
l0 + σ-at 76.24%
R-ImageNet ResNet-50
[31]
94.46%
Table 4: Accuracy of the attacked models. We here re-
port the accuracy on the test (validation set for Restricted
ImageNet) set of the models introduced in Section 5.
B. Experiments
We here report the details about the attacks, the attacked
models and the parameters used in Section 5. The test accu-
racy (validation accuracy for Restricted ImageNet) of every
model introduced in the paper is reported in Table 4.
B.1. Evaluation of l0-attacks
The architecture used for this experiment is the Net-
work in Network from [17], which we trained accord-
ing to the code available at https://github.com/
BIGBALLON/cifar-10-cnn, adapting it also to the
case of MNIST (which has different input dimension).
We run PGD0 with ten thresholds k (that is the maxi-
mum number of pixels that can be modified), which are
k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20} for MNIST and k ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20} for CIFAR-10.
Running times We report the average running times for
one image for the experiments in Section 5.1 (the times
for SparseFool are those given by our reimplementation,
which uses DeepFool as implemented in [27]). MNIST:
LocSearchAdv 0.6s (from [25]), PA 21s, CW 300s, Sparse-
Fool 2.5s, CornerSearch 9.8s, PGD0 0.06s (one thresh-
old). CIFAR-10: LocSearchAdv 0.7s [25], PA 22s, CW
283s, SparseFool 1.0s, CornerSearch 3.6s, PGD0 0.19s (one
threshold). ImageNet: SparseFool 17s, CornerSearch 953s,
PGD0 13s (one threshold).
Figure 5: Left: original. Right: l0-adversarial example with
clearly visible changes along axis-aligned edges.
Stability of CornerSearch Since Algorithm 1 involves a
component of random sampling, we want to analyse here
how the performance of CornerSearch depends on it. Then,
we run CornerSearch for 10 times on the models used in
Table 1 and get the following statistics: MNIST, success
rate (%) 97.37 ± 0.13, mean 9.12 ± 0.05, median 7 ± 0.
CIFAR-10, success rate (%) 99.33±0.12, mean 2.71±0.02,
median 2 ± 0. This means that our attack is stable across
different runs.
B.2. Sparse and Imperceivable manipulations
In Figure 5 we show an example of how changes along
axis-aligned edges are evident and easy to detect, even if the
color is similar to that of some of the neighboring pixels.
This provides a further justification of the heuristic we use
to decide where the images can be perturbed in an invisible
way.
In Figures 6, 7 and 8 we illustrate how the l0 + σ-
map attack produces sparse and imperceivable adversarial
perturbations, while both the l0- and the l0 + l∞-attack
either introduce colors which are non-homogeneous with
those of the neighbors or modify pixels in an uniform back-
ground, which makes them easily visible. Further exam-
ples can be found at https://github.com/fra31/
sparse-imperceivable-attacks.
MNIST In Figure 6 we show the differences among the
adversarial examples found by our attacks CornerSearch
(l0-attack), l0+ l∞-attack and σ-CornerSearch. We see that
our l0 + σ-map attack does not modify pixels in the back-
ground, far from the digit or in areas of uniform color in the
interior of the digit itself.
The attacked model is the plain model from Section 5.3
(more details on the architecture below). For the l0 + l∞-
attack we use a bound on the l∞-norm of the perturbation
of δ = 0.2.
CIFAR-10 We show in Figure 7 more examples built as
those in Figure 3 of Section 5. The attacked model is the
plain classifier from Section 5.3 (more details on the archi-
tecture below). For the l0 + l∞-attack we use a bound on
the l∞-norm of the perturbation of δ = 0.1.
Retricted ImageNet We show in Figure 8 more exam-
ples created as those in Figure 4 of Section 5. The attacked
model is the ResNet-50 from [31] (both weights and code
are available at https://github.com/MadryLab/
robust-features-code) already introduced in Sec-
tion 5.1. For the l0 + l∞-attack we use δ = 0.05 as bound
on the l∞-norm of the perturbation.
B.3. Adversarial training
MNIST The architecture used is the same as in
[21] (available at https://github.com/MadryLab/
mnist_challenge), consisting of 2 convolutional lay-
ers, each followed by a max-pooling operation, and 2 dense
layers. We trained our classifiers for 100 epochs with Adam
[15].
The plain and l∞-at models are those provided by
[21] at https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_
challenge, while we trained l2-at using the plain gra-
dient as direction of the update for PGD, in contrast to the
sign of the gradient which is used for adversarial training
wrt the l∞-norm.
For adversarial training wrt l0-norm we use k = 20 (maxi-
mal number of pixels to be changed), 40 iterations and step
size η = 30000/255. For l0 + σ-at we set k = 100, κ = 0.9
(for the bounds given by the σ-map), 40 iterations of gradi-
ent descent with step size η = 30000/255.
CIFAR-10 We use a CNN with 8 convolutional layers,
consisting of 96, 96, 192, 192, 192, 192, 192 and 384 fea-
ture maps respectively, and 2 dense layers of 1200 and 10
units. ReLU activation function is applied on the output of
each layer, apart from the last one. We perform the train-
ing with data augmentation (in particular, random crops
and random mirroring are applied) for 100 epochs and with
Adam optimizer [15].
For adversarial training wrt l0-norm we use k = 20 (num-
ber of pixels to be changed), 10 iterations of PGD with step
size η = 30000/255. For l0+ σ-at, we use k = 120, κ = 0.6,
10 iterations of PGD with step size η = 30000/255.
C. Adversarial examples of σ-PGD
We want here to compare the adversarial examples gen-
erated by our two methods, σ-CornerSearch and σ-PGD.
In Figures 9 and 10 (see also https://github.com/
fra31/sparse-imperceivable-attacks) we
show the perturbed images crafted by the two attacks, as
well as the original images and the modifications rescaled
so that each component is in [0,1] and the largest one equals
1. Moreover, for σ-PGD we report the results obtained with
a smaller κ. The gray images indicate unsuccessful cases.
It is clear that σ-CornerSearch produces sparser perturba-
tions. Moreover, σ-PGD with the same κ used for σ-CS
gives more visible manipulations. We think that this is
due to two reasons: first, the whole budget of k pixels
to modify is always used by σ-PGD, while this does not
happen with σ-CS, and second, σ-PGD aims at maximizing
the loss inside the space of the allowed perturbations. This
is possibly achieved by modifying neighboring pixels,
which sometimes have slightly different colors, in opposite
directions (that is with λi with different signs for different
i). Conversely, σ-CornerSearch does not consider spatial
relations among pixels, and thus it does not show this
behaviour. However, as showed in the Figures, it is
possible to recover less visible changes also for σ-PGD by
decreasing κ, at the cost of a smaller success rate.
D. Propagation of sparse perturbations
To visualize the effect of very sparse perturbations on
the decision made by the classifier we can check how the
output of each hidden layer is modified when an adversarial
example is given as input of the network instead of the
original image. We here consider the plain model used
in the comparison of the different adversarial training
schemes on CIFAR-10 in Section 5 and the adversarial
examples generated by CornerSearch on it.
We perform a forward pass first with the original images
as input and then with the adversarially manipulated ones.
In Figure 11 (more examples at https://github.
com/fra31/sparse-imperceivable-attacks)
we plot (each color represents an image of the test set) the
difference between the output values, after the activation
function, of each unit of the network obtained with the
two forward passes. The vertical segments separate the
layers, and the leftmost section shows the difference of the
inputs. The horizontal lines represent no difference in the
values between the two forward passes. We can see how,
going deeper into the network (towards right in Figure 11),
the sparsity of the modifications decreases (the perturbed
components of the input are on average 0.21%, those of the
last hidden layer 19.45%) while their magnitude becomes
larger, so that changing even only one pixel (that is three
entries of the original image) causes a wrong classification.
original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.64% original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.38%
l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:4.2% l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:1.9%
<-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:5.4% <-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:2.4%
Figure 6: Different attacks on MNIST. We illustrate the differences of the adversarial examples (second column) found by
CornerSearch (l0), l0 + l∞- and σ-CornerSearch, respectively first, second and third row. The third column shows the zoom
of the area highlighted by the red box while the fourth column contains the map of the modified pixels (sparsity column).
The original image can be found top left and the visualization of the σ-map (rescaled so that maxi σi = 1) bottom left.
original l_0 perturbation sparsity:0.29% original l_0 perturbation sparsity:0.2%
l_0 + l_inf perturbation sparsity:1.7% l_0 + l_inf perturbation sparsity:2.3%
<-map l_0 + <-map perturbation sparsity:7.1% <-map l_0 + <-map perturbation sparsity:6.6%
Figure 7: Different attacks on CIFAR-10. We illustrate the differences of the adversarial examples (second column) found
by CornerSearch (l0), l0 + l∞-attack and σ-CornerSearch, respectively first, second and third row. The third column shows
the adversarial perturbations rescaled to [0, 1], the fourth the map of the modified pixels (sparsity column). The original
image can be found top left and the RGB representation of the σ-map, rescaled so that maxi,j σij = 1, bottom left.
original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.2% original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.05%
l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:7.4% l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:3.2%
<-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:6.5% <-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:2.7%
original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.03% original l_0 zoom sparsity:0.11%
l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:5.7% l_0 + l_inf zoom sparsity:4.1%
<-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:3.5% <-map l_0 + <-map zoom sparsity:3.5%
Figure 8: Different attacks on Restricted ImageNet. We illustrate the differences of the adversarial examples (second
column, zoom in third column) found by CornerSearch (l0), l0 + l∞-attack and σ-CornerSearch, respectively first, second
and third row. The fourth column shows the map of the modified pixels (sparsity column). The original image is in the top
left and the RGB representation of the σ-map, rescaled so that maxi,j σij = 1, bottom left.
original σ-CornerSearch, κ = 0.8 σ-PGD, κ = 0.8 σ-PGD, κ = 0.6
Figure 9: Comparison σ-CornerSearch and σ-PGD on MNIST. We show the adversarial examples generated by σ-
CornerSearch with κ = 0.8, σ-PGD with κ = 0.8 and σ-PGD with κ = 0.6, together with the respective perturbations
rescaled to [0,1]. The sparsity level used for σ-PGD is k = 50.
original σ-CornerSearch, κ = 0.4 σ-PGD, κ = 0.4 σ-PGD, κ = 0.25
Figure 10: Comparison σ-CornerSearch and σ-PGD on CIFAR-10. We show adversarial examples generated by σ-
CornerSearch with κ = 0.4, σ-PGD with κ = 0.4 and σ-PGD with κ = 0.25, together with the respective perturbations
rescaled to [0,1]. The sparsity level used is k = 100. The gray images means the method could not find an adversarial
manipulation.
Figure 11: Propagation of perturbations. Difference in the values of each unit of the network obtained when propagating
images of the test set and adversarial examples associated to them. The vertical segments distinguish the units of different
layers, so that the input space is shown on left and the output on the right. Each color represents an image.
